by David Gadfrey
Need for a new fighter aircraft (NFA) for the Canadian Armed Forces to replace first the McDonnell CF-101 Voodoo and later the Lockheed / Canadair CF-104 Starfighter stems from Canada's withdrawal from the "multi-role combat aircraft for 1975" (MRCA-75) that became the Panavia Tornado, now serving with the British, German and Italian air forces.
The MRCA-75 began indirectly in 1965 when variable-sweepback designs were considered in the United Kingdom, but the die was cast in 1967 when France pulled out of the Anglo-French variable-geometry fighter project and put all its resources behind the Dassault Mirage G.
British policy was revised to abandon defence of Far East bases at about the same time that Germany was considering the NKP ("nuen karnpffiugzeug," or "new battleplane") aircraft.
Germany was joined by Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada in a consortium to develop this type of airplane and in July, 1968 was joined by the U.K. Between 1968 and 1969, Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands withdrew from the project. The Panavia consortium was established in March, 1969 and in May the definition phase of the MRCA-75 prograrn was agreed to by the remaining participants.
The Rolls-Royce RB.199-34R three-shaft afterburning turbofan was selected as the powerplant in September, 1969. The MRCA-75 was to replace the F-104G in Germany, the F-104G and Fiat G.91R in Italy, and the Canberra, Vulcan and Buccaneer in the U.K. Later, the U.K. decided on an air defence variant (ADV), Tornado to replace the FRG.2 Phantom and Lightning,
Ironically, the U.K. Canberra/Vulcan/Buccaneer replacement requirement would have been met by the cancelled TSR-2 airplane, just as the cancelled Avro CF-105 Arrow would have more than met the roles performed by the Bomarc missile, CF-101B and CF-104. Thus, if the Arrow had not been cancelled, and if Canada had not pulled out of the MRCA-75 program, the Canadian Forces would not have needed an NFA since the Tornado would be replacing the Arrow. Had this happened, the engines for the Tornado - which are about half the power of the Orenda lroquois for the Arrow-might well have been a joint program between Rolls-Royce and Orenda Engines. Or the NFA choice might have been either the McDonnell Douglas F-15 or General Dynamics F- 16 powered by an Iroquois derivative. In any case, the Northrop/Canadair CF-5 would not have been needed.
GONE ARE THE DAYS OF LICENCED PRODUCTION OF SABRES,
T-33s, F-104s AND CF-5s.
So much for what might have been. As it was, the NFA requirement in 1978 was a pressing need to replace ageing and obsolescent interceptor CF-101Bs operating with NORAD and ground-attack/interdicion-strike CF-104s operating with NATO in Europe.
The NFA was to be a single, multi-purpose design as the most cost-effective choice to reduce training costs, simplify inventories of spare parts, and minimize repair and overhaul facilities. These were the views of Gen. W.K. Carr, then head of Air Command of the Canadian Forces, and Barnett Danson, then Defence Minister. Gen. Carr believed that a single aircraft type would provide the option of modifying or changing defence policy, ". . . without being constrained by considerations of inventory - investment value . . . " so the CF could interchange aircraft between roles and between deployment in North America and Europe. An important aspect of NFA selection was that the choice was not to be made only on technical merit of a particular design, but also on the advantages of the industrial benefits package offered to the Canadian government.
Gone were the days of large-scale licenced production of North America F-86 Sabres, Lockheed T-33 Silver Stars, CF- 104/F-104Gs or CF-5/NF-5s.
The Canadian aerospace industry was certainly capable of building any of the NFA contenders, but costs for manufacturing only 138 sophisticated aircraft with their engines and systems would have been prohibitive, even allowing for the benefits of technology transfer in such areas as fabrication of advanced composites. Thus, it was appropriate to arrange for some parts to be made in Canada - including avionics - and for the remainder of the purchase price (originally, $2,034 million) to be offset by Canadian production either of components of other aircraft or systems built by the winning foreign company, or of non-aero- space items.
The original NFA contenders were the Panavia Tornado, Grurnman F-14A Tomcat, McDonnell Douglas F-15A Eagle, General Dynamics F-16A Fighting Falcon, Northrop F-18L Cobra II and McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet. The Dasault/Breguet Mirage 2000 had been ruled out because it was not fully developed and in any case was strictly an interceptor and air-superiority fighter.
The request for proposals (RFP) did not specify a single aircraft type, although this was obviously to be preferred with such a small total purchase. This, in theory, meant that a batch of ex-U.S. Navy old-model F- 14As might be teamed with a batch of Grumman A-6E Intruders for the ground- attack role. Similarly, the then pure-interceptor F-15A might be teamed with McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawks for ground attack. Other candidates for the ground-attack role were the Vought A-7 Corsair II and the Fairchild A-10 Thunderbolt II. Further two-plane possibilities were a mix of F- 15/F- 16 or F- 14/F- 18.
Eventually, the NFA choice boiled down to selection between the F-16A and the F/A-18A, the F-18L being rejected on the grounds that it was not fully developed and that development costs would be prohibitive. It was then entirely logical that the F/A-18 should be the winner, largely because of its two engines as opposed to the single engine of the F-16A. It was felt that a vital factor was operation of the NFA over Canada's largely uninhabited and unforgiving terrain where having a second engine would minimize attrition - not to mention easing the minds of the pilots. Clearly, the other basic factor was the nature and scope of the industrial-benefits package.